Towards a Comparative Philosophy of Science

Co-editor (together with Simon Lohse) of a special issue of the Journal for General Philosophy of Science

This special issue seeks to initiate a new research theme which aims at a systematic comparison of scientific fields and practices from a philosophical perspective, in short: a comparative philosophy of science.

While the beginning of philosophy of science in the 20th century was characterized by a strong focus on physics, there are now a large number of different philosophies of the special sciences. These do not only include the philosophies of the natural and the social sciences, but also various philosophies of the humanities and the formal sciences, as well as interdisciplinary fields such as climate science and cognitive science. This diversity offers a rich reservoir of opportunities for comparison between the different (philosophies of the) special sciences. A comparative approach to philosophy of science can generate important insights and promote progress in at least four dimensions:

• Systematic comparison of epistemic and social-epistemic practices: A comparative approach provides us with a rich and nuanced picture of epistemic practices (such as classification, explanation, prediction), as well as social-epistemic practices (such as peer-review) in different disciplines.
• Comparative conceptual analysis: A comparative approach enables a better understanding of scientific core concepts such as “objectivity”, “theory”, “model” or “reduction” by highlighting contrasts and analogies across fields. It can also contribute to a refined analysis of the function of these concepts in the different sciences.
• Comparative metaphysics of science: Comparing the role of ontologies or the relationship between theoretical claims and ontological commitments in different domains of science (e.g. physical and social sciences) may stimulate novel perspectives in ongoing debates on topics like realism, structuralism or individualism.
• Insights into methodologies and practices in different philosophies of the special sciences: A comparative approach can create insights into philosophical practices. This may facilitate a better understanding of differences in doing philosophy of science by exploring why philosophy of science is sometimes considered more of a reflective meta-discipline and sometimes more on a continuum with the respective special science.

Is Implicit Bias Real? On the Applicability of the Vera Causa Ideal in Social Science

Manuscript in preparation; to appear in late 2025.

Implicit bias is a frequently invoked explanatory concept in social-psychological studies of discriminatory and prejudiced social behavior. A common way to detect implicit attitudes is via indirect measurement, e.g. in the so-called Harvard Implicit Association Test developed in the late 1990s. This paper discusses the validity of indirect measures of implicit attitudes in social psychology by referring to the so-called vera causa ideal that played a historically important role in the assessment of theoretical entities primarily in biology or the earth sciences. The goal is to critically evaluate the standards for existence claims about theoretical entities in social psychology and the social sciences by raising questions concerning the comparability and transferability of methodological standards from one scientific domain to another. An early version of the paper was presented at the Pitt QUAD Conference in Miami in June 2024.

Trade-offs Between Truth-Conduciveness and Trust-Conduciveness in Scientific Practice

Paper project together with Elena Popa.

A common way to justify trust in scientific knowledge is to point at the truth-conduciveness of the processes involved  in its production. These processes include social-epistemic practices and norms like peer review, replication, critical discourse, disinterestedness, epistemic coherence, or evidence backing up knowledge claims. It is the truth-conduciveness of these practices and norms— i.e., they increase the likelihood of true and decrease the likelihood of false beliefs—that provides us with good reasons to trust scientific knowledge. On this view, epistemic practices are trust-conducive when they are truth-conducive. 
In this paper, we challenge this claim. We argue (as others have argued before), that the truth-conduciveness of a set of epistemic practices and norms does not automatically guarantee trust-conduciveness. The trustworthiness of knowledge produced by truth-conducive practices must be established independently—i.e., by other or additional practices and norms. By looking at these two components independently, we are able to analyze cases where truth-conduciveness and trust-conduciveness are in conflict—a underexplored ramification of investigations of trust in science.
We conclude that addressing trade-offs between truth- and trust-conducivness requires acknowledging not only the importance of pluralism and value judgments, but also, more importantly, tensions with epistemic desiderata.

Prediction and Uncertainty in Scientific Practice

Book project in progress.

In this book project, I investigate the epistemic and practical importance of predictive practices in modern science. Questions concerning the role and value of predictions are widely discussed topics in many fields of science. Scientists not only frequently make predictions, they also engage in debates about the value of successful predictions, about the limits of their predictive capacities, or about whether predicting is a legitimate goal of science in the first place. The book also explores the under-examined role of prediction in philosophy. While explanation has long been extensively analyzed, prediction, despite its central place in scientific inquiry, has received comparatively little attention by philosophers of science.
Prediction has attracted my interest as a research topic, because predicting is an activity that builds the bridge between the realm of theoretical knowledge and the applications of that knowledge in the real world. Predictions are the middle man, so to speak, between our theoretical understanding of reality and the multifaceted technological applications that impact all aspects of modern life.
Drawing on historical and contemporary examples, the book highlights the diverse functions of prediction across disciplines, from physics and climate science to biology and the social sciences. It emphasizes the dual role that prediction plays in scientific practice: as an epistemic tool for theory testing and as a forecasting instrument guiding real-world decision-making. Special attention is given to the close relationship between prediction and uncertainty, showing how predictive practices often reveal the limits of scientific knowledge.

2020 – 2024
Pluralism in Science-Based Policy: An Integrative Model
with Simon Lohse

In a series of papers, we argue that evidence-based policy needs to take epistemic pluralism seriously, especially when facing complex policy issues like a global pandemic. Inspired by Paul Feyerabend’s pluralism, we propose a pluralistic and integrative model of policy-advice that suggests to include a plurality of disciplinary scientific perspectives as well as non-scientific sources of knowledge into policy advice. We also discuss practical challenges of the integrative model. We believe that a pluralistic approach leads to more robust, democratic, and context-sensitive policies.

2015 – 2024
Paul Feyerabend’s Philosophy in Current Contexts

A major inspiration in my work is the philosopher Paul Feyerabend, especially his advocacy for epistemic pluralism. Pluralism holds that fostering diverse theoretical and methodological perspectives is essential not only for scientific progress but also for maintaining the credibility and legitimacy of science in democratic societies. While I have also engaged with Feyerabend’s work in a historical perspective, evaluating his contribution to 20th century philosophy of science, I am particularly interested in highlighting the relevance of Feyerabend’s thinking in current debates. In 2021, I had the privilege to edit a collected volume on Feyerabend’s philosophy for Cambridge University Press together with Jamie Shaw.